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T. Brettel Dawson* Legal Research in a Social
Science Setting:
The Problem of Method
I. Introduction
As part of its ongoing process of curriculum development, the Depart-
ment of Law at Carleton University decided in 1988 that a compulsory
course in legal research methods was long overdue in the B.A. Honours
degree in Law. Fortified with interest nurtured by methodological de-
bates in feminist scholarship,' experience devilling' for a barrister pend-
ing my call to the bar, and practice from instructing a course in legal
research and writing while a graduate student, I set about developing the
proposed course. No guidelines existed for such a course, beyond the
logic that it should complement the socio-legal or legal studies focus of
the Department.' To the best of my knowledge, no precedents existed in
Canada. 4 In this paper, I reflect upon my questions and discoveries in the
design and teaching of the initial course.
*Associate Professor of Law, Dept. of Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, Carleton University,
Ottawa, Ontario.
1. The literature is voluminous, but see in particular, S. Harding, ed., Feminism and Method-
ology (Bloomington, Indiana: Open University Press, 1987); J. McCarl Neilson, ed., Feminist
Research: Exemplary Readings in the Social Sciences (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); K.
Bartlett, "Feminist Legal Methods" (1990), 103 Harvard Law Rev. 829; L. Smith, "What is
Feminist Legal Research?" in Winnie Tomm ed. The Effects of Feminist Approaches on
Research Methodologies (Calgary: Calgary Institute for the Humanities, 1989) 72; S. Harding
and M. B. Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
1983); J. Kelly-Gadol, "The Social Relation of the Sexes: Methodological Implications of
Women's History" (1976), 1 Signs 809; R. Duelli Klein, "How to Do What We Want to Do:
Thoughts About Feminist Methodology" in G. Bowles and R. Duelli Klein, eds., Theories of
Women's Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 88; L. Stanley and S. Wise,
Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1983); D. Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1987); S. Harding and J. O'Barr, eds., Sex and Scientific Inquiry
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
2. A quaint term by which the legal profession refers to legal researchers, although my
Chambers English Dictionary defines it as being "a drudge (esp. legal or literary)", or doing
the menial work of others. It does make one reflect on one's past!
3. See generally J. Barnes, "The Department of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa" (1977), 3
Dalhousie L. J. 814; R. L. Campbell, "Law as a Social Science" (1985), 9 Dalhousie L. J. 404;
R. L. Campbell, "Survey of Carleton's Law Graduates" (1986), 10 Dalhousie L. J. 173.
4. Interestingly, K. Carson and P. O'Malley of the Department of Legal Studies at LaTrobe
University in Melbourne, Australia are currently developing a course entitled "Introduction to
Socio-Legal Research." Some law schools in Canada have developed or are developing
courses which consider the use of social science data in litigation.
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A methodologically sound proposition is that one must have a basic
focus or question in any inquiry, and that it is best formulated and stated
at the outset. Accordingly, the basic question with which I engaged in the
course and reflect upon in this paper is: how does one conduct research
in law within the legal studies perspective, in a way which 'takes law
seriously' as itself an object of study and explores the role of law in social
regulation and social change? The point of departure is also significant.
In defining the issues and selecting approaches, a social scientist may
well begin from a different point than a lawyer schooled in the methods
of professional legal education in the doctrinal tradition.' The ideal point
of departure may well be "the interdisciplinary intersection of the social
sciences, including but not privileging... law trained colleagues attracted
to empirical inquiry on law-related matters."6 But, one must begin where
one is. I first learned my 'legal method' within a traditional law school,7
my 'legal critique' in a graduate law school odyssey (in the words of my
perplexed supervisor),8 and my 'socio-legal questions' in the field, once
joining the faculty at the Department of Law. The process, then, has
become an opportunity to resolve some of the scholarly tensions nurtured
in my professional life over a number of years.
Personal quest aside, my basic question raises other issues and
questions, some of which relate to the capacity to work with "a general
5. By 'doctrinal tradition' I refer to the still dominant form of legal scholarship within
professional law schools, which plays a significant role in constituting law as a separate
discipline or 'normatively closed field of inquiry', which proceeds on the basis that law "can
be studied independently of its social, economic, cultural or political context': Neil Sargent,
"The Possibilities and Perils of Legal Studies", (Carleton University, April 1991), forthcom-
ing, at 1. See also R. Cotterrell, "Law and Sociology: Notes on the Constitution and
Confrontations of Disciplines" (1986), 13 J. of Law and Society 9; M. Galanter, "The Legal
Malaise: Or, Justice Observed" (1985), 19 Law and Society Rev. 537; S. Macaulay, "Elegant
Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract" (1977), 11 Law and Society
Rev. 507; S. Macaulay, "Law and the Behavioural Sciences: Is There Any 'There' There?"
(1984), 6 Law and Policy 149.
6. As noted by F. Levine, "Goose Bumps and 'The Search for Intelligent Life in the Universe'
in Sociological Studies: After Twenty-five Years" (1990), 24 Law and Society Rev. 7 at 9.
7. I read for my LL.B. in New Zealand where it is generally a 'first' degree, unlike the graduate
school model of North American law faculties. This moderates the academic aloofness of the
law faculties: one attends the University rather than 'the law school' in common parlance.
Professional education was still the major goal of my law school however, where legal
positivism was reinforced by the lingering influence of the 'Oxbridge model', seemingly
untouched by the winds of Legal Realism that at least washed through North American law
faculties.
8. Inthecourse ofpreparing athesis on estoppel doctrine in contract law, I becamevery excited
by epistemology, feminist legal studies, and the role of law in the market (society).
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theory about the relationship between legal and social phenomenon," 9
and others of which concern sources, ends, and procedures in research.
For example, what research skills and frameworks are required to do
'legal studies research'? How important is theory in research methodol-
ogy - in helping us to understand how and what we 'know', and in
influencing the questions we can ask or consider worth asking? Should
one aim to 'do good law', and what might that mean anyway? Is it
important to teach techniques of finding and reading cases, statutes, and
government documents, or is it a distraction (and if so, from what)? What
resources do we (and our students) need to know about and be able to use
to "do good legal studies research'? What points of access exist to the
institutional and ideational sources of law? 0 Can we bring new questions
to existing resources which contain embedded assumptions about what is
important and how it should be categorized?" What is the role of
empirical enquiry, and how does it relate to use of documentary law
sources? How central should be the techniques of creating or interpreting
empirical knowledge? 2 Underlying such questions is another fundamen-
tal query concerning the extent to which it is possible or desirable to
define and develop an autonomous legal studies field of inquiry and
methodology. The process of explicating these issues is one in which a
number of my colleagues are engaged. 3 My aim in this paper, then, is to
9. Galanter, "The Future of Law and Social Science Research," at 1065.
10. P. Goodrich, Reading the Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
11. See in particular, R. Delgado and J. Stefanic, "Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law
Reform, Critical Librarianship and the Triple Helix Dilemma" (1989), 42 Stan. L. Rev. 207.
12. See also Cotterrell, "Notes on Constitution and Confrontations"; J. Brigham and C.
Harrington, "Realism and its Consequences: An Inquiry into Contemporary Sociological
Research" (1989), 17 International Journal of Sociology of Law 41; P. Schuck, "Why Don't
Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?" (1989), 39 J. Legal Educ. 323.
13. Seeforexample: Sargent, "Possibilities and Perils"supra, note 5; A. Hunt, "What is Legal
Studies? Reflections on the First Legal Studies Graduate Program" forthcoming (Carleton
University, 1990). In December 1988, the Jurisprudence Centre Series sponsored by the
Department, held a Roundtable on the theme: "Law and Social Inquiry". The panelists were
Hans Mohr (Law, Osgoode Hall Law School), Phil Harris (Law, Sheffield Polytechnic); Tulio
Caputo (Sociology, Carleton); and Brettel Dawson (Law, Carleton). Other discussions are
ongoing.
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contribute to that process as well as to emerging dialogue about legal
method in a social science setting.1
4
In teaching the course, I have adopted a structure which echoes my
evolving model of the research process - beginning with the research
setting, moving to development of the research question, identification
and use of research resources and then to analysis and the "research
product'. I have taken something of a similar approach to the structure of
this paper. In what follows, I discuss the methodological implications of
the legal studies context, and debates about approaches to research and
research resources. In particular I focus on the role of the research
question, the relationship between a conceptual approach to research
versus a technical skills approach, the idea of research as a process and
the issue related to authority and interpretation in 'reading' sources in the
research process. I conclude with observations on where the methodo-
logical project might go from here.
II. The Legal Studies Context and its Implications for Method
In beginning to think about legal studies method, the parameters of legal
studies itself must first be sketched in to provide the setting or context for
the research to be undertaken. Defining the 'field' of inquiry, even in a
somewhat preliminary fashion, permits the ambit and focus of appropri-
ate research questions to be established. If nothing else, it answers
students who want to know what kind of research they are 'supposed to
be doing'. This discussion of the 'research setting' is particularly appro-
priate insofar as the precise ambit of 'legal studies' is a subject of
14. There is of course, a fundamental difference between 'social sciences in law' and 'law as
a social science'. See generally, J. Monahan and L. Walker, "Teaching Social Science in Law:
An Alternative to Law and Society" (1985), 35 J. Legal Educ. 478; C. Tremper, "Sanguinity
and Disillusionment: Where Law Meets Social Science" (1987), 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 267;
J. Getman, "Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research" (1985),35 J. LegalEduc. 495.
These papers can be contrasted with D. Trubek and J. Esser, "Critical Empiricism in American
Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pandora's Box?" (1989), 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 3; C.
Harrington and B. Yngvesson, "Interpretative Sociolegal Research" (1990), 15 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 135 (Response to Trubek and Esser); A. Sarat, "Off to Meet the Wizard: Beyond
Validity and Reliability in the Search for a Post-empiricist Sociology of Law" (1990), 15 Law
& Soc. Inquiry 155.
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considerable debate. 5 One or other of my colleagues has described
aspects of the project in the following terms:
16
[Legal studies] treats 'law' and 'legal systems' as its focus of study and
commences from the assumption that two of the most crucial questions
are: what counts as law and ... what is the relationship between law and
power;
[Legal studies] assumes that law is a social phenomenon which cannot be
studied in isolation from its social, economic and political context.
However, this does not mean that we should regard law as simply a product
of, or reflection of external ... forces, values or interests ... [but] also...
the law (the legal terrain, juridical field) should be regarded as a site or
mechanism through which competing conceptions of social relations and
social ordering are articulated, given privileged meanings and contested;
[Legal studies] is firmly rooted in social scientific traditions of enquiry.
Legal rules, concepts, structures, institutions and personnel are situated in
their social, economic and political contexts. Our legal studies approach
goes beyond 'law in context' or 'law as a reflection of social forces'. It
eschews the professional law school's fascination with doctrine, and on
the other hand, empiricism. Rather, a critical approach is taken both
internally and externally ... Law is examined in its own conceptual terms
[and] law is examined in terms of practices;
Legal studies views law as itself asite-of knowledge and power, studies the
constitution of law in society and permits a range of approaches to the
study of law: empirical, deconstructionist, theoretical [etc.];
[Legal studies'] conception of law is of a set of practices and discourses
which constitute a'legal' or 'juridical field' which is generated by the
intersecting activities of agents (judges, lawyers, court officials, legisla-
tors, litigants, social activists, etc.), and institutions (courts, legal profes-
sion, legislatures, administrations, social movements etc.) To explore this
conception of law it is necessary to adopt the concept of a 'standpoint'
which draws attention to the fact that the legal field not only appears [to
be different] but is different when approached from the situation of
different participants within the legal field.
15. See eg. Galanter, "The Future of Social Research in Law"; Macaulay, "Any 'There'
There?" supra, note 5; P. Harris, "Approaches to the Teaching of Law through Social Science
Perspectives", (Jurisprudence Centre, Carleton University, 1985); J. Hagan, "The New Legal
Scholarship: Problems and Prospects" (1986), 1 Can. J. L. & Society: Symposium Issue:Law,
Ideology and Social Research (1988), 9 Legal Studies Forum; Special Issue: Socio-legal
Research and Policy Issues (1988), 10 Law and Policy.
16. The discussion of legal studies from which these quotations are taken, was stimulated in
part by the development of a Masters Degree in Law in the Department, and in part by a
rethinking of our first year Introduction to Law course. A flurry of "thoughtpiece' memos on
the topic circulated among faculty working on the first year committee, in the fall of 1989. I
have chosen to quote without attribution, but I have the originals on file.
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Some key ideas in these etchings are that legal studies goes 'beyond
law in context', eschews a fascination with either doctrine or empiricism,
and views law as part of social organization. The focus of study becomes
any person, process, or institution which is 'endemically legal' in an
expanded sense. By moving beyond formal law or state law, legal studies
problematizes the very concepts of 'law' and 'legal practices'. It also has
a far wider sweep than 'conventional legal scholarship' which tends to be
directed to doctrinal analysis of 'primary legal sources' (texts) for the
purpose of explaining, evaluating, and predicting judicial or legislative
decisions or formal law reform.' 7 The concept and function of 'doctrine'
is itself an interesting object of study. In short, the juridical field is itself
an object of inquiry, together with interpretive issues related to the
standpoints of legal actors and, indeed, of researchers. As my colleague,
Alan Hunt has commented:
The [legal studies] project explicitly adopts law as its 'object of inquiry'
and locates that study within the social sciences. The location within social
sciences is contrasted with 'interdisciplinary' approaches which make use
of the methods of other disciplines but sees these as 'tools' or 'techniques'
to be applied to an already constituted object of inquiry.'
Clearly, methodological implications flow from such ideas. The
objective of legal studies research cannot be formulated as being to 'find
the law' or to apply 'found law' to particular situations (doctrinal
method). But, at the same time, one cannot simply take a 'law' or 'the law'
and study it 'in action in society' in an empirical sense. 19 Because a legal
studies perspective disrupts assumptions underlying canons of 'data' and
'knowledge' about 'law' whether 'on the books' or 'in action', it is not
enough, methodologically, to simply add together social science knowl-
edge from social data and legal knowledge from law data, and call it
'socio-legal' knowledge.
As this begins to sink in, the scope of the undertaking, innocuously
referred to as a course in legal studies research method, becomes
apparent. I recall one of those 'startling moments of insight' during the
initial planning stages of the course, when I realized that the project
precariously straddled already constituted disciplines. The research set-
ting, then, could be described as being between a rock and a hard place,
or as another colleague Neil Sargent puts it more eloquently, "there ...
17. See M. Bayles, "The Purposes of Contract Law" (1983), 17 Valpariso University Law Rev.
613.
18. A. Hunt, "What is Legal Studies?", at 1.
19. See generally F. Munger, "Law, Change and Litigation: A Critical Examination of an
Empirical Research Tradition" (1988), 22 Law and Society Review 57; D. Trubek, "Where the
Action is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism" (1984), 36 Stan. L. Rev. 575.
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remains what could be called an "epistemic gap" between the manner in
which knowledge about law is produced within the doctrinal tradition...
and the ways in which knowledge about law ... is produced outside the
legal academy."2 In teaching research methods in legal studies, the aim
must be to produce neither (positivist) legal scholars nor (legal) sociolo-
gists - and certainly not positivist legal sociologists! Indeed, legal
learning as it exists, empirical enquiry as it exists, and the relationship
between the two, cannot simply be assumed. Rather, they must be rebuilt
in order to construct new, pluralist, and non-positivist ways of looking at
the legal system. This, then, is the ongoing challenge.
II. The Course: Legal Research Methods
In this part of the paper, I briefly discuss the contours of the course which
arose from my ruminations, in order to provide a framework for my
subsequent discussion of the teaching process and observations. In the
clipped and capsule format of the University Academic Calendar, I
described the course as:
[a]n introduction to basic methods used in the design and execution of
research projects in law in a social science context. The course considers
research principles, the significance of theoretical approaches taken to
research and the diversity of law-related materials and research proce-
dures. Computer-assisted legal research, elementary problem solving
skills, bibliographic and citation skills will also be developed.2'
There is, then, a certain flexibility in the description, a certain ambi-
tiousness in the course, and a degree of ambiguity about the project which
should come as no surprise. I explained my objectives in the course
outline as being to "instill some sense of what it means to do law research
and what kinds of questions students might want to ask and pursue; thus,
I am trying to assist students in becoming competent in their ability to
locate and analyze law/law-related material."
The course was offered over a thirteen week semester, and was divided
into three segments: the research setting, the research process, and the
research product. The first class was organizational and the second, an
introduction to research method issues. Four classes examined the
'research setting', focussing on theories of research, issues of objectivity,
advocacy, and bias, and considering the field of inquiry encompassed by
legal studies. Six classes centred around the 'research process' and were
spent largely in 'hands-on' sessions. Part of each class was spent in
overview and debriefing in relation to the particular process and set of
20. Sargent, "Possibilities and Perils", supra, note 5, at 13.
21. Now Law 51.397* Legal Research Methods, Carleton University, Undergraduate Calen-
dar 1990/91, at 174.
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resources being introduced. An on-line computer database training
session was also scheduled during this segment of the course. Finally, and
lamely enough, one class was spent on the research product. As this class
was also used to 'wrap up' the course, it was clearly informal. This slender
dedication of time to writing resulted in part from an anxiety to avoid
having the course develop into a non-substantive 'legal research and
writing course', and in part from an (optimistic) expectation that the
writing skills of upper year students would be well developed. This
expectation was dashed fairly early on! This new found realism together
with an observation that writing is itself a process within research and
analysis, has since lead to a greater time allocation to writing issues.
22
In its initial incarnation, the course was offered as a special topics
course and was open only to fourth year law honours students.3 The class
was limited to 25 students. The purpose of the enrollment limitation was
to permit the course to operate as a hands-on workshop. There was
considerable pressure on enrollment- indeed students were packed to the
walls on the first day of classes in the (vain) hope that I would throw the"
course open to all. This enrollment pressure indicated considerable
student demand, and as planned the course has now been 'regularized'.
One amendment has been to offer it as a third year course, rather than as
a fourth year 'honours' course. Many students expressed amazement that
they had come so far without knowing 'how to do research' (surely a
sobering thought for us all). The guinea pig students were clear that
placing the course earlier to permit completion before embarking on their
major honours essay in fourth year would be of great benefit. The pressure
to move the course of the third year level, then, was compelling.24 The
course is now required for law honours students, and continuing small
class size in each section of the course will mean that in practice, the
course will be limited to honours students.
22. The questions around which the course was structured, and which were contained in the
course outline, are appended to this paper.
23. 1 also admitted on a discretionary basis, two third year honours students who were mature
students and one.'special' student who had graduated from the programme and currently
worked with a legal database firm.
24. Interestingly, having now taught the course to groups of fourth year students and third year
students, I have noticed a marked difference between the initiative and independence of the
groups. Third year groups seem anxious to receive information which they may or may not
concentrate on, while fourth year groups seem more confident about creating and questioning
information/knowledge.
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IV. Evolving Research Principles
My experience with the students in the living course, as is so often the
case, sparked new insights and brought both answers and new questions.
Rather than discuss each issue or question in turn, I have chosen to focus
on three tensions which became apparent in the course. These tensions
were between instruction in research theory and in technical skills or 'nuts
and bolts', between knowing about books or knowing about research
processes; and between reading for information and reading as analysis.
From teasing out the complexities of these tensions, three central princi-
ples in legal studies research can be suggested.
The first principle is that one must have a research question. This
research question inevitably (and fruitfully) reflects the topic and scope
of research and also what the researcher considers to be worthwhile
asking and why. From the well-defined research question flow the
research trajectory and selection of the appropriate sources and methods.
A second principle is that research is an integrated process. Instruction in
research method, then, is best directed to developing research strategies
and approaches rather than simply instilling isolated technical and
bibliographic skills. Researchers must understand what they are doing
and why. They must also be efficient and independent. A third principle
is that research is about analysis and the creation of new knowledges. The
location of sources, no matter how satisfying in and of itself to budding
library sleuths, is simply preparatory. To complete research, sources must
be analyzed within an interpretative framework and be related back to the
research question. Accordingly a theory and practice of 'reading', is
integral to independent and critical thought. The following sections
expand on these principles and the tensions from which they sprang.
V. Know Yourself
(Or, Have Fun and Have a Research Question)
Researching can be a panicked and deadeningly boring exercise for most
undergraduate students. They have to write an essay by date X on topic
Y for Professor Z. The inevitable tends to be avoided for as long as
possible, before being produced as quickly as possible, with as little effort
as possible. Research often appears to have been conducted in an ad hoc
fashion, with sources being regarded as lucky finds. Bad experiences can
easily lead to 'research aversion', or at the least, to bad habits. Like the
Delphic oracle, I suggest that some of the solution to this malaise may lie
in the researcher 'knowing herself' - in this case experiencing herself in
the research process and knowing what she is doing and why she bothers.
This breaks down into two components. The first is the need to have the
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researcher 'present' in the research project; the second is the need for
focus and direction in the project itself.
From the outset, I wanted to convey to the students that research could
be enjoyable and that they could be 'present' in their research: it could
matter to them, they could choose it because it interested them, and they
could do what they wanted to do with it. The puzzle was how to convey
these ideas in a congruent manner. It was solved in a satisfying manner
by Sandra Kirby and Kate McKenna, in their bookExperience, Research,
Social Change: Methods from the Margins, which was a course text3y
They outline two ideas: a self-guided library tour 'unlike any you may
have been on before', and attention to 'conceptual baggage'. The library
tour is a fascinating innovation, which I have dubbed 'library tourism'.
Students are encouraged to set aside an hour or so to browse in the library
however their spirit leads. No expectations, no limits, no end products and
no 'shoulds'. Students can start with a general topic, a specific word, or
even just a physical place in the library. The exercise is intentionally
open-ended. The tour works on the premise that everyone likes a
conservation, and the library is a lively bustle of conversations between
authors proposing and debating various ideas, information and opinions.
The whole tour is entirely free form.
Students who undertook the adventure were enthusiastic. They were
staggered that research could be their own-notjust some task set by some
professor-and that it could be fun; in fact, that they could enjoy.following
their (research) nose. It also helped students to find out what kind of
researcher they were: for example, stream of consciousness ('well, I
started out with judicial appointments and got interested in judge's wigs
and ended up looking at the history of horse racing' or, 'I started with the
word 'black' and got a reference to black bass, and from there I went to
fish parasites, and I found out about one really interesting parasite with
an incredibly sexist name, so I began to think about gendered language'),
'obsessive/compulsive' ('well, 500 items showed up on the computer in
response to my query- so I had to look through them all ... yes, every last
one of them just in case one might be relevant'), confident or unconfident;
associative etc. Many students said it was the first time they had actually
enjoyed being in the library.
Conceptual baggage is another way in which researchers can come to
'know themselves' and work with their strengths and dispositions. By
'conceptual baggage', Kirby and McKenna refer to the mix of assump-
tions, premises, experiences, values and beliefs held by the researcher
25. S. Kirby and K. McKenna, Experience, Research, Social Change: Methods from the
Margins (Toronto: Garamnond Press, 1989).
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about the topic/question. The conceptual baggage is often the source of
the interest in the topic and the angle taken by the researcher. Awareness
of conceptual baggage, which inevitably exists in any researcher, can
provide insight about choice of topic and direction. It can alert a
researcher to her potential biases. At the same time, conceptual baggage
can highlight the strengths and priorities that the researcher is bringing
into a project. Instead of pretending it isn't there (objectivity?), acknowl-
edging conceptual baggage ensures that the researcher is there in the
research (objectively?). This idea may well be a step in developing
scholarship and avoiding advocacy, no matter how well dressed.26
Focus in research is a second step in researchers coming to know who
they are and what they are doing. The centrepiece of effective research is
an effective research question. Research must be animated by a 'problem'
or 'hunch' from which the thesis of the work and its basic questions can
be crafted. Easy to say. However, in thinking about how to incorporate
this idea into the new course, I ran across two significant 'research design
issues'. The first was the effect that the research question itself might have
on research implementation, and the second was how to generate the
research problems by which students might be impelled into their own
research process.
What I mean by the first design issue, is illustrated.by the model of
research question generally adopted in texts on legal research. Christopher
Wren and Jill Wren,27 for example, suggest that a legal problem involves
analyzing 'facts' to isolate 'issues' on which 'law' can then be located,
(with appropriate updating), analyzed (for relevance, weight etc.) and in
turn applied, to give a 'correct', or at least, arguable opinion as to what
a judge might be predicted to do (or should be persuaded to do, from the
point of view of an advocate or legal academic). Pretty clearly this view
is stimulated by 'one right answer' jurisprudence.28 It also involves an
instructional agenda which communicates to students what 'thinking like
a lawyer' involves and how to define and resolve legal problems. It
follows a traditional lawyer/client advice model with a correspondingly
26. See generally R. Cramton, "Demystifying Legal Scholarship" (1986), 75 Geo. L.J. 1 at7-
8. Much legal scholarship, he comments, "pretends to an objectivity which it does not deliver,
it fails to state or examine the premises on which it is based; and it conveys a hubris of truth
or righteousness ... that is inconsistent with the humility of the true scholar."
27. C. Wren and J. Wren, "The Teaching of Legal Research" (1988), 80 Law Libr. J. 7.
28. I thank Alan Hunt for this point. Sir Owen Dixon, an eminent former Chief Justice of the
High Court of Australia clearly adhered to this view of legal research and judicial decision. See
0. Dixon, "Concerning Judicial Method", in Jesting Pilate (Australia: Law Book Co, 1965).
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limited conceptions of the need and use for legal research. Furthermore,
the idea that law in research or practice might be beneficially critiqued,
is quite absent from their definition of the task.29 To Wren and Wren-, law
tools, then, are ready to use and skills are honed in their use. Of course,
as most law tools are in fact organized to facilitate this research model,
their approach and the assumptions on which it based actually may be
quite correct within doctrinal law research.
Of conceptual interest to me was to note how the definition of the
research problem effectively sets the trajectory of research implementa-
tion: different questions/assumptions lead to different research directions
and resource needs. If we follow the trajectory envisaged by the indexers
and cataloguers of traditional documentary law texts, we can easily find
ourselves asking only certain kinds of questions and in certain kinds of
ways. If we ask different questions, not only may we need different,
additional, or alternative tools, but we may have difficulty using existing
legal tools: there may be no category or heading for what we are looking
for. My students were frustrated in this way more than once. Yet, rather
than scampering back to the fold, I think that by asking different kinds of
questions, legal studies both defines itself and lays the basis for its
method. Thus, the generation of the research problem and its definition
are of central importance in thinking about 'legal studies research'.
My primary objective has been to encourage students to formulate a
specific question to which research can be directed, rather than meander-
ing around in a large topic area. Meandering seems to me to be a
preliminary part of becoming lost. All topics can generate a host of
different questions and angles. The choice of specific approaches is
influenced by the particular interest and perspective of the researcher. For
example, alternative treatment options for young offenders can raise
questions of whether the orders are constitutional (age discrimination
etc.), justified (control of juvenile crime by way of adequate punishment
and deterrence etc.), or consistent with rights of privacy and consent to
treatment. Together with narrowing a topic to a particular question comes
the requirement to answer the 'so what' aspect by being able to give an
account of why the information is worth seeking out and what will be
known when the information is gathered together and analyzed. In this
way, a context, hunch, and thesis for research can be molded into a helpful
research question.
29. This omission may be connected to the care taken by Wren and Wfen to point out that they
are practicing attorneys. This seems to be directed to credentialing their opinions as 'relevant'
rather than academic - another of the ironies which seem to abound in legal research
instruction!
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When I turned to the second design issue, of how to generate research
questions, I again differed from the model suggested by Wren and Wren
who present students with raw data (a factual setting) from which to
construct a common research problem 'template'. I decided it would be
more fruitful for students to develop their own research questions which
would in turn form the basis of subsequent individually defined instruc-
tion. Apart from a latent agenda of steering students away from 'thinking
like lawyers', three basic reasons underlay my decision. First, I wanted
to emphasize the central importance of having a research question and to
integrate into the course the process by which research questions are
generated.30 Secondly, I wanted to really take Wren and Wren (and
myself) seriously in seeking to make instruction relevant and interesting
to the individual students. Thirdly, I wanted to know what kind of (law)
questions our students find interesting.
In the result, my students raised enormously diverse topic areas and
sub-topics. These topics included environmental regulation (wildlife
protection, adequacy of regulation); young offenders (admissibility of
statements, alternative treatment programmes); violence against women
(limitation periods; judicial attitudes; forms of state intervention); equal-
ity rights (discrimination against the disabled; feminist litigation; em-
ployment equity/hiring practices; child custody) law reform (effects of
the amended prostitution law; abortion regulation); legal theory (feminist
engagement with law; radical criminology and fear of crime among the
elderly); drinking and driving (alternative sentencing; incidence of
underage drinking and driving; severity of sentencing); and legal process
(judicial appointments; plea bargaining; mediation). Some students pro-
fessed undying interest in constitutional law issues while others squirmed
at the thought, many students regarded criminal law as riveting, and so on
-pretty much like any group of students. However, in this case they were
set loose in the same class!
The range of topics and nascent questions also raised conceptual
issues. It seemed to me that some students hadn't 'cottoned on' to what
a'law problem' was during theirthree completed years of law at Carleton.
While I am speaking with tongue in cheek here, it was very noticeable that
their initial questions' looked like sociology problems without much
connection to law at all, not even law as 'endemically legal social
practices'. Maybe they didn't think law was that interesting after all! Or
maybe, this legal reticence may have reflected a tentativeness in relation
30. I devoted some class-time, scheduled appointments with two or three students at a time,
and the first assignment required completion of a 'research proposal' setting out the research
question and issues arising from it.
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to the legal studies context, which for many of the students was explicitly
discussed for the first time in this class, despite the whole course of law
study at Carleton being built around elements of a legal studies approach.
It became necessary, then, to explore with students, what it was about
their questions that connected them to 'legal enquiry'.
Is it, for example, a 'law enquiry' to want to find out how much
discrimination occurs against physically disabled young people and how
it occurs? Or, does the 'law' in questions of disability, relate only to
examining what constitutes discrimination, what remedies exist or should
exist in cases of discrimination, and exploring how effective they may be?
Is an examination of the social and legal constructions of disability, a law
enquiry? Might looking at the extent of discrimination against young
disabled adults, in turn, be a prerequisite to identifying a problem for
which legal remedies might be sought?
It seems to me that the various 'cut off' points in defining 'legal
enquiry' or the point at which law is, or should be involved, are not simply
arbitrary, but deeply theoretical positions about the scope and application
of law. What change in 'world view' is wrought by changing an enquiry
about whether alternative measures are 'good' for young offenders into
whether the law has a right to order such treatment? For example, which
of the following possible questions is more of a 'law question' and why:
(i) is mediation more effective than litigation in resolving custody
disputes? (ii) what is the impact and significance of the construction of
power relations in mediation? (iii) does mediation protect the important
procedural and fairness interests of parties to a dispute? There is a need
to tread lightly here. Forcing a 'doctrinal gloss' onto the question can
diminish and circumscribe the richness of the inquiry and begin to direct
it toward particular kinds of answers. A broader approach directed to
finding more about law in all its facets needs to be taken.
In addition of these weighty conceptual issues, practical method issues
also arose from the more or less unreined generation of research ques-
tions. Feeling a little bit like the sorcerer's apprentice, I found myself
surrounded by 25 energetic research questions, and endless tangents.
This is a good exercise for those seeking to relinquish professorial control
over students' learning experiences! Secondly, it was clear that some law
materials would not be relevant for some projects. For example, one
student wanted to examine the Supreme Court of Canada judgments of
Madame Justice Wilson and compare them with what was known of her
background, to see if being a woman judge had made any difference." For
31. In one of life's finer ironies, just as this student concluded that it had made no difference,
the judge gave the 1990 Barbara Betcherman Lecture at Osgoode Hall Law School, entitled
"Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?" in which she argued that they very well
might.
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this project, legislative material was not really relevant, although we
struck a compromise when I had the student locate legislation empower-
ing judicial appointments. A third problem, since remedied, was the lack
of structured follow-through. I did not require students to complete their
research or to prepare a finalized essay based upon it. I suspect that this
had the dual effect of diminishing the relevance of the work and
permitting tangents to multiply unchecked. Subsequently I have required
some written work based on the research question, although I worry that
this might lessen flexibility and experimentation in the course. Finally, I
found myself seriously hampered by limited class time. Three hours is
precious little time to introduce appropriate resources and finding tools,
and have students become confident and proficient in their use. This
situation is accentuated if they are all looking for different things. One
way to alleviate the problem was to have students work in small groups
in the library. The use of 'research buddy networks' has ameliorated this
problem.
In short then, setting up research correctly involves several critical
elements. First, students must be welcomed into their own role as
researchers and be encouraged to make the leap from being 'receivers of
knowledge' to becoming creators of knowledge. Some deep-set habits
and anxieties may need to be overcome in this process. Secondly, their
research must be animated by aresearch question which is consistent with
the field of inquiry, that is, legal studies. Great care must be taken to avoid
the influence of pre-existing assumptions about law research problems
encoded into formal law sources. Thirdly, research should be guided by
a specific problem or question which is relevant to the interests and
concerns of the individual student researcher. Finally, the presence of the
researcher in the question also suggests that her 'conceptual baggage' -
the mix of assumptions, premises, values and beliefs held by the re-
.searcher about the topic/question - should be acknowledged. Not only
does this avoid unconscious bias, but it also permits these'starting points'
to offer insight and direction to the research.32
VI. Know Where You are Going
(Or, What Are You Doing With That Book?)
It has been observed often enough, that legal research courses have
traditionally not been part of the curricular mainstream but have, rather,
languished (more or less resourced) somewhere in the margins as a
32. See further Kirby and McKenna, Experience, Research, Social Change, supra, note 25.
33. Wren and Wren, "Legal Research", supra, note 27; Achtenberg, "Legal Writing and
Research: The Neglected Orphan of First Year" (1975), 29 U. Miani L. Rev. 218.
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necessary chore, but with little academic challenge or interest.3 In some
law schools, legal research is taught as a separate course, while in others,
one section of a compulsory first year course, such as criminal law, is
taught as a 'small group' with the dual objectives of imparting method
and substance? 4 Generally speaking, the methods course or component
is regarded as 'not real law', and as not integral to the curriculum. At the
same time, it is an almost universal lament that instruction in legal
research method is generally unsuccessful. 5 Clearly I was anxious to
avoid a similar fate for my research course - particularly as I had had the
experience of teaching in a law school legal research and writing course,
seemingly scorned as much by other faculty as it came to be by students.
A key insight in my salvation from such a fate, was stimulated from the
work of Wren and Wren. They link the ineffectiveness in research
instruction with a failure to conceptualize research as a process. 36 They
note that much legal research instruction proceeds from a bibliographic
approach which aims to teach students which books are in the library and
what elements they each contain.37 Thus, law school courses often
amount to a dignified sort of show and tell 'enlivened' with interwoven
treasure hunts. The concepts of why one might want to consult these
books, or at what stage of research, are a missing link. Students are
thereby structurally disabled from developing or implementing coherent
research strategies, and are not confronted with choicemaking and values*
in research and in research tools. Wren and Wren suggest an alternative
in which students are introduced to various sources when they become
relevant to the solution of the research question. The idea is that students
must know what sources exist, when to use them, what to use them for,
and how to use them.
From these ideas flow the second principle of research methodology
posited from the course: that research is an integrated process which
requires the development of strategies and approaches to materials, rather
than rote learning of technical and bibliographic skills. Accordingly, my
starting premise was that students should be encouraged to develop "a
theory and analysis of how research should proceed",38 together with an
34. Method, of course, does infuse pedagogical practices in all courses. Thus, for example,
'case law method', or requiring that cases be read, has developed an approach to legal texts and
expands the 'legal contexts' of law students. See generally M. Davies,"Reading Cases" (1987),
50 Mod. L. Rev. 409.
35. This lament itself raises the issue of research skills for what, and for whom? Sadly, the
experience to date has not even been that the 'wrong' skills have been learned for the contexts
in which graduates place themselves, but that research skills have generally not been learned
or integrated to any useful degree.
36. Wren and Wren, "Legal Research", supra, note 27.
37. Ibid.
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epistemological consciousness of knowledge creation: of "who can be a
knower, what tests beliefs must pass in order to be legitimated as
knowledge, what kind of things can be known. '"39 However, in discussion
while designing the course and in subsequent experience teaching it, I
was presented with an alternative argument that the goal should be to 'get
the students into the library and tell them what's there so they can go
ahead and use it.' These alternatives represent a tension between techni-
cal or skills training and developing a conceptual approach to research.
40
My preference is clearly for the conceptual approach.
However, there was considerable pressure from students for me to
provide technical skills training: to provide the 'nuts and bolts', relatively
unadorned. To take a sampling from comments made on my course
evaluations:
"the first couple ofclasses were somewhat different, but the coursebecame
very useful shortly after."
"articles on legal scholarship were not really that helpful."
"there was a nice combination of studying skills and studying the philoso-
phy of method; not only learned valuable academic skills by learning
research techniques, but also marketable skills."
"the purpose of the course was, I thought, to teach research methods, yet
the first three months concentrated on theory ... more time should have
been given to the research methods (sources) than was given."41
"the first half of the course was interesting but a waste of time."
"on a practical level, this may have been one of my most useful courses to
date."
Oh well. An immediate question arising from these comments, is what
makes something 'useful' or 'useless'? 'That it is relevant' may be an
equally immediate answer, but this begs the question of relevance to
what. If it is to 'getting ajob', the necessary question is what kind ofjob?
If it is to learning 'methods', it is not self-evident whether that means
techniques, research strategies or understanding what one is doing and
why. Surely, what is 'useful' or 'relevant' must ultimately depend on
context and purpose. Another objection has to do with the pedagogical
38. S. Harding, "Is There a Feminist Method?" in Feminism and Methodology, at 2.
39. Ibid., at3.
40. Compare A. Podgarecki, Law andSociety, (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1974), at48.
41. As the course was only 13 weeks long, this student clearly overstated the time spent on
research theory. Perhaps, their estimate reflected how long it felt for them!
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assumptions which underlie the demand for the nuts and bolts. Technical
instruction runs the risk of complementing a conservative, professional
model of legal education which "tends to take the practice of law as a
given, and to respond to practice rather than to attempt-to shape it. The
professional model perceives the law professor as a teacher of these
professional data and skills."42 However, critical legal education rejects
these assumptions.43
While I readily concede, even insist, that a researcher must be techni-
cally skilled, such skills are not developed, nor are they exercised, in a
neutral vacuum. Indeed, rather than being endlessly malleable, some
tools tend to mold the researcher, and "confine thought to the familiar
categories of traditional legal theory." 44 Legal tools are especially prone
to appear 'value-neutral' or value-free. A 'nuts and bolts' approach to
legal method, assumes that the tools, and indeed the products being
constructed, both exist and are straightforward: one simply has to set
about doing the job. The whole project of legal studies renders this
assumption problematic.
Another question that necessarily arose from this discussion of con-
cepts and techniques, had to do with which sources are relevant or useful
for legal studies research and into the use of which students should be
inducted: ie. which nuts and which bolts? As Delgado and Stefanic point
out, "[r]elying on [legal tools] exclusively.., renders innovation more
difficult; innovative jurisprudence may require entirely new tools, tools
often left undeveloped or unnoticed because our attention is absorbed
with manipulating old ones."45
The course description cited above suggests a focus on "the diversity
of law-related materials and research procedures," including traditional
documentary sources of law, and sources of information about law. In my
initial conception, it was the definition, interpretation and uses of legal
texts in research which formed the bulk of research process instruction.
In part, this focus on law materials may have been an offshoot of my
scholarly background - what I have been trained to think of as being
important, or even perhaps, just what I have been trained to think of at all!
I should add in my defence that my conceptualization of the core of legal
texts significantly exceeds that prescribed by most standard legal re-
search manuals.
42. B. Feldthusen, "The Gender Wars: 'Where the Boys Are' (1990), 4 Can. J. Women &
L. 66, at 82.
43. See further F. Munger and C. Seron, "Critical Legal Studies v. Critical Legal Theory"
(1984), 6 J. of Law and Society 257.
44. Delgado and Stefanic, "Same Stories" supra, note 11, at 225.
45. Ibid.. at 208.
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. Several practical and conceptual issues suggested this parameter as a
starting point for the course. As any legally trained scholar knows, there
is a vast expanse of 'formal' law-related material in a number of different
categories: judicial and quasi-judicial material; legislation and legislative
evaluations; parliamentary material, commission reports, and other gov-
ernment documents; law reform material, - all further bisected by diverse
jurisdictions/countries and time periods, historical and current. This
terrain is marked by a host of indexes, different categorization schemes
and organizational principles, and particularities. Anyone who wants to
reliably and intelligently discuss this material must be able to locate it,
update it, and know what kind of animal it is. Knowledge of this core of
law material cannot be assumed or fudged by legal researchers/students.
The effect of a drunk driving law cannot be discussed usefully by a
student who can't locate the original legislation and any amendments to
it. Equally knowing how to use this material and not be intimidated by
it seems to be a prerequisite to being able to critique the assumptions and
values contained within it, and to being able to take law seriously as an
object of inquiry.
However, while law texts may be necessary, they are also not suffi-
cient, to use a current turn of phrase. The research questions which the
students generated from use of a legal studies framework, all connected
law to social practices. A focus on law texts only, then, gives students
only part of what they need to pursue their research. Indeed, if the essence
of legal studies is context and standpoint, such 'internal' or self-defining
law sources are only part of what is required to understand law. Moreover,
establishing, or accepting, a dichotomy between 'law research' and
'social research' is not fruitful to the project of 'taking law seriously as
an object of inquiry'. Law exists in social practices, and modes of
ordering or regulation of society are wide ranging.
The social research dimension and interest in the effectiveness of law
apparent from the student research questions, pressed me to think about
the scope of materials and 'sources' relevant to legal studies research.
Some sort of empirical material, whether created or located become
necessary. Much of the student interest seemed to reflect the established
concern of 'law and society' with the 'gap problem': a perceived
difference between 'law on the books' and 'law in action'. But, while this
interest in'gap problem' research indicated that students were anxious to
understand law in abroad sense, it gave rise to an additional methodologi-
cal problem in relation to the use of social research resources. Students
must learn how to read, analyze and integrate social research in their law
problems in an 'authentic' and appropriate way. Too often legal research-
ers seem to treat social research, especially statistics, in the same way
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boars might forage for truffles: tasty tidbits to supplement the dinner.
Munger and Seron suggest that legal researchers, even critical legal
researchers, tend to use social research in a highly selective manner, to
support already mapped out arguments.46 Moreover, the 'gap problem'
raises issues of what we should, or do, expect law to be like or to achieve.
What is, after all, the significance of locating a 'gap' between law in
practice and law in the books? And, how can a gap, or the 'effectiveness'
of law be measured?47
But, to return to the central issue of process. In this section I have
discussed the pitfalls of assuming the body of material and sources for
research and I have insisted that technical skills be developed in conjunc-
tion with an awareness of the appropriate uses and limitations of the
resource tools. A much expanded understanding of legal research mate-
rials is necessary to assist informed legal studies research. A strategic
approach to research involving the staged introduction of relevant mate-
rials and tools reinforces these ideas. After development of the research
question and identification of issues and possible approaches, it was
suggested that students follow a pattern of consulting general sources
before moving to the most relevant primary or first-hand sources around
which the research question hinged. Once identified, the tools by which
these sources could be located were introduced. Various approaches to
sources were also suggested: topical, key words, statute-based and so
forth. As a consequence, not every source was introduced to every
student. Ideally, however, those sources and tools that were of concrete
relevance were introduced into the research skills of students.
VII. Know When You Have Arrived
(Or, When you Find a Case, What Have You Found?)
Thus far in the paper, I have described a relationship between my planned
objectives in the course, their refinement from experience in the course
and my subsequent ruminations. My path to articulating the third princi-
ple of research-the role of reading/analysis -was rather more unscripted.
Two classes in the initial course were rather surprising. Both related to
how material is read, or consislered in the legal studies research process.
The first class had to do with authority in legal sources; the second
concerned interpretation.
46. Munger and Seron, "Critical Legal Theory", supra, note 43.
47. See further Galanter, "The Future", supra, note 9; Macaulay, "Any 'There' There?",
supra, note 5; Cotterrell, "Constitution and Confrontation", supra, note 5; David Nelken, "The
"Gap Problem" in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review" (1981), 1 Windsor Yearbook
to Access to Justice 35.
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As may be apparent, I found myself struggling at various points of the
course with 'voice', or more accurately, struggling to consistently speak
in a 'different voice' from that of traditional legal research.4" Nowhere
was this more stark than in a class innocuously enough called 'the law
setting'. My plan was to perambulate through the kinds of library-based
law sources and their organization, discussing the various types of law
sources, and their chronological and topical arrangement in order to lay
a basis for the much heralded "strategic approach to the legal research
process. 49 I also planned to distinguish between primary and secondary
sources, and put in a good word for the merits of starting with primary
sources." This class followed intensive discussions of socio-legal studies
and theory issues in research design, and was intended to begin the
transition into research implementation.
All began well. I had a diagram neatly on the board and was launching
into an exegesis of some of its finer points, when a sort of rustling began
among the students. I noticed that bemused looks had appeared on the
faces of my students as if they were asking, "Is she serious or what?"
Innocently enough, I inquired as to their reactions to the material being
presented. What followed was a highly charged discussion. "What," they
queried, "was a 'primary authority' and who said that it was one?" "How
can sources by labelled absolutely as being either primary or secondary?"
In particular, the idea of cases as primary authority raised eyebrows:
"Aren't case reports simply judges interpreting other judges (points of
law) or judges interpreting litigants' evidence and hence mediating
reality (points of fact)?" "The whole notion 'of a distinction between
primary and secondary sources, imports the idea of authority. But, which
sources are 'law'? Which sources have authority and what gives them that
48. The allusion is to Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1985).
49. J. Ramsfield, "Book Review" (1986) Section on Legal Writing, Reasoning and Research
Newsletter (October) 15, at 15. See also Wren and Wren, "Legal Research", supra, note 27,
at 17 and 34-36.
50. As noted by Wren and Wren, ibid, at 43, n. 121, a researcher "can start with either primary
or secondary authorities [but] starting with secondary materials rests on the questionable
assumption that students should acquire their first taste of legal research by working with
sources that have been called 'the least authoritative, the least reliable, the most misleading and
the most overrated' of legal research sources." Quoting Schmid, "Book Review" (1962-3), 8
Utah L. Rev. 160, at 162. 1 agree with Wren and Wren that students need to be encouraged to
think critically and independently in research and that the best place to begin, therefore, is with
'primary authorities'. A problem at the undergraduate level is that students may lack the
necessary store of legal contexts with which to approach primary sources, or to have not moved
from being 'received knowers'. See generally M. Davies, "Reading Cases" (1987), 50 Mod.
L. Rev. 409; M. Belenky, B. Clinchy, N. Goldberier and J. Tarule, Women's Ways of Knowing
(New York: Basic Books, 1987). The more basic problem as it turned out in my classtime was:
What is a primary authority?
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authority: is it how we relate to them?" Furthermore, "isn't making the
distinction at all, [between primary and secondary] simply an outgrowth
of conventional legal research methods?" "Surely, it's a distinction which
reinforces a view of what is legitimate or not!" No legal positivists these!
A debate followed about whether some sources were 'extrinsic' for
some research but 'intrinsic' to other research problems. The only
compromise that could be reached, not that I was holding to my position,
was that "it depends on the kind of research you are doing." This apparent
relativity, of course, flies in the face of the hierarchical ranking of 'law
sources'. It is, however, quite consistent with an approach that
problematizes 'formal' law and asks different kinds of questions about
'the legal'. The interesting point, of course, is that legal sources have
built-in systems of authority, which seek to entrench systems of thought
and enquiry in law. Hence, the power balance between researcher and
source may also shift with this compromise. Instead of the researcher
bowing to the source as the sanctioned, authoritative pronouncement, the
researcher may retain an evaluative stance with reference to sources, and
locate their own 'truth' in relation to the research question. My newly
empowered students did concede the point that whatever source was
(first) used, the temptation to let other's do the thinking for them should
be resisted. This is an essential component in developing a 'reading'
stance to research.
Another component of developing a reading stance in research can be
derived from the insight from critical scholarship that (legal) meanings
are both mediated and constructed. Accordingly, legal documents have
a range of significations, and there are many layers and purposes in the
production and analysis of legal documents. These include textual or
discourse analysis, studies in the translation of experience into discourses
of authority and versions of reality; observation of (judges') legal method
in action; the relation of law to politics; and the relation of a law case to
its local setting (context). In legal studies research, a case (or other legal
document) can be read (or indeed written) at any one or several of these
levels or aspects. As Martin Davies argues, before the legal significance
of a case can be discerned ('read'), the text of a decision must be placed
within a context that is legally relevant. Its legal interpretation depends
upon the significance which the legal reader identifies by situating the
case within her or his store of information and purpose. Contexts differ
between readers, and 'legal' readings allide with 'non-legal' readings.51
51. Davies, "Reading Cases", ibid.
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My second unscripted happening in the course convinced me that an
understanding of this kind of dynamic in reading is a crucial component
of legal studies method. The 'happening' on this point related to an
evaluated assignment. I asked students to 'research' Bromley London
Borough Council v. Greater London Council.5 2 This case involved a
dispute over public transit subsidies, which erupted between a local
authority and a regional council in England. During an election for the
G.L.C., the Labour Party candidates promised in their manifesto that they
would reduce public transit fares and levy local authorities to raise the
projected shortfall in funding. Once elected they proceeded to do so. The
actual cost of the reduction doubled, because of 'claw-back' penalties
imposed by the Conservative central government. One of the local
authorities levied by the G.L.C. refused to pay the supplementary rate
precept, and challenged the authority of the G.L.C. to issue the levy. Its
application for judicial review went as far as the House of Lords. The
House of Lords quashed the supplementary precept on the grounds that
it was ultra vires, did not accord with 'ordinary business principles', and
breached the fiduciary duty owed by the G.L.C. to its ratepayers. The case
is a fascinating example of law, politics and economics neatly packaged
in judicial reasoning.
I assigned several tasks in relation to this case. Students were required
to find the reported case from a general description, give correct legal
citations to it, and undertake rudimentary updating - to judicial and
academic considerations of the decision. This was meant to reinforce
technical skills. I hoped that students would systematically and effi-
ciently progress through the various steps involved as they had been
instructed earlier in the course.53 The core of the assignment, though, was
a requirement that students 'read the case' and tell me what it was about.
On the assignment sheet, I expressed the task in the following terms:
"This case can be read different ways... What is your reading of the case?
What other readings are possible? When youtfind this case, what have you
found?"
52. [1983] 1 A.C. 768, [1982] 1 All E.R. 129.(C.A. and H.L. (U.K.)).
53. I also hoped that students would go beyond law reviews to the forums of other disciplines.
John Griffith, for example has a short piece in Marxism Today: John A.G. Griffith, "The Law
Lords and the G.L.C." (1982), 26 Marxism Today 29-31, and various comments have
addressed the economic, public transport aspects and dynamics of municipal politics con-
nected to the case. See for example, M. Loughlin, "Municipal Socialism in a Unitary State" in
P. McAuslan and J. McEldowney, eds. Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution, (London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1985); P. Morrisey, "Should We Subsidise Public Transit?" (1983), 54 Political
Quarterly 392; P.E. Garbutt, London Transport and Politicians (London: Ian Allen, 1983).
Generally see M. MacKintosh and H. Wainwrigtt, The Taste of Power: The Politics of Local
Economics (London: Verso, 1987). Interestingly, very few students located or looked for
comments outside of 'law' sources.
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The results were intriguing (from my point of view at least). Almost
all the students spent forever on the mechanics and hardly any on the
reading. Moreover, they found it incredibly frustrating that I hadn't told
them how many citations they should have: how would they know when
they were finished? Nor could they understand why I had weighted 50%
to reading the case: what did that have to do with the 'research process'?
Also, as they didn't have a context in which to read the case (mea culpa?),
they didn't know what it meant, or what was important. Should they focus
on the transport aspect, the administrative law aspect, the statutory
interpretation aspect, the economic aspect, or the political aspect? Ulti-
mately nearly everyone presented a single reading of the case, with no
reference to having chosen between alternative possibilities and little
apparent tolerance for the co-existence of different readings/meanings.
Their reading was 'right', and effectively excluded alternative readings.
Surprisingly few students thought that the case might have been part of
an enormous political fuss (which it was) or that it implicated law in
politics (which it does). Perhaps it is not such a surprise given that relating
law to politics, or other contextual elements generally, is excluded by the
form of internal legal discourse (judicial decisions).
Nevertheless, as 'raw data' for thinking about legal method, the
student responses raised some further questions: What did my students
think cases were? What did they think judges do, and in what context, if
any? Why was there a difficulty in translating the theory of 'law', at which
they had become adept, into concrete application?54
We went over the assignment in class after I had marked it. Because
the students had done all the work, and suffered all the frustrations, this
discussion was very connected for the students. Their interest spanned
across the technical elements, to interpretations of the case, and why it
54. Several pedagogical issues also arose out of this example. How much of my agenda should
I have shared directly prior to handing out the assignment? Should the exercise have been a
class project rather than a graded assignment? Should I have found several cases of equivalent
richness to lessen the competitiveness fostered by the 'hunt' for the one case and, incidentally
to lessen the 'cobbling' (or was it co-operation) of sources between students? How is a task like
this compatible with the process-orientation of students using the time for their own research
projects?
Subsequently, I have used the case as an 'in-class' example - handing it out one week and
telling students to 'read it' for the next class. They come to the next class somewhat frustrated
and mystified. The more charitable think that the case really must be about legal method rather
than boring old administrative law, but that they must have missed something. The point of the
exercise becomes clear when I ask them what the case is about. From the range of readings,
insight about interpretation and research flow. My favourite moment was when a student said,
"Well, I just read the case for the important bits and sifted the rest out." Of course, no context
had been given by which 'importance' had been defined! This then, lead nicely into my
interpretive points without all the agony.
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matters to understand something of the interpretation process in research.
This class also finally gave students a context in which the approach the
case. In its absence, there had been little to ground the exercise. Without
a context (or research question/focus) there had been nothing to which
they could concretely apply their theoretical skills (save of course their
unarticulated contexts). As one of my students commented to me later
about her experience with the assignment:
In Bromley I wanted to challenge the demand to 'read' the case in light of
the gap I sensed between the kind of research it entailed and what I was
working on for my own research project. It has since struck me that the
'gap' or missing link in Bromley was the absence of a research question to
animate the inquiry, and by which I could analyze the case or construct a
legal meaning. In simpler terms, I resisted Bromley on the heels of
developing my own research project because the approach used was
bibliographic. The 'problem' of finding etc. was very legal, and the
'methods' it employed were very bibliographic. On the other hand, the
'problem' of reading the case became very socio-legal. I became as
frustrated as -, because I wanted to 'read' the case as I had been taught,
ie. in light of the research question asked, but -Ihad no question. ... This
leads me to ask whether it is the generation of a research question that is
vital to legal research in a social science setting. [This then may be similar
to feminist arguments that] it is not new 'methods' but new problematics,
concepts, hypotheses and purposes of enquiry which have generated such
research.5
The tensions identified in the exercise by this student as between
bibliography and process, reading and context, and 'legal' and 'socio-
legal' tasks, reflect inherent design tensions in the course and in the wider
methodological project as I conceived it. In some ways, the assignment
was a microcosm of the course. Yet in the tensions, creative possibilities
and insights were highlighted. Technique separated from methodology
reinforces the approach for which the techniques were originally de-
signed, rather than generating new problematics. Interpretation is central
to research, and is necessarily linked to research question. The interpre-
tive process hinges on context which is theoretically mediated. Finally,
the 'field' of legal studies inquiry is law broadly and contextually defined.
Students had found only part of 'the law' when they had found the case.
VIII. Conclusion
No course stands still, and the methods course on which this paper has
been based is no exception. In the process of writing this paper, I have
seen new problems and new solutions, many of which I have begun to
55. Correspondence from Angela MacDonald to the author, July 1990 (on file).
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explore further. From conversations with colleagues in the process of
writing the paper, I have sensed renewed interest in questions of method
in legal enquiry. Yet, I worry that new methodological initiatives will be
limited to teaching lawyers about social science methods for use in
litigation, or social scientists about law for use in empirical studies. In
such a scenario, the reconceptualization of the 'law' on which such
research is based, and indeed of the legal research methods needed for it,
might be seen as being irrelevant or unnecessary. Both lawyers and social
scientists might remain well pleased with their disciplines as constituted.
Indeed, the doctrinal paradigm of law has considerable life left within it,
and existing research methods seem to 'solve' the kinds of problems
generated within it. But, with recognition that law is not autonomous of
society but in some sense maps, reflects or helps form society and social
ordering, then law itself must become an object of inquiry. Existing legal
research methods cannot solve the kinds of problems, the 'new
problematics', generated within this altered frame of reference about
'law'. As Marc Galanter pointed out as long ago as 1974,
we need more from the research enterprise than merely complementing
legal learning as it exists by adding an empirical dimension. Instead we
should be interested in the task of theoretical construction or reconstruc-
tion of ways of looking at the legal system - of expanding our conceptual
apparatus to encompass features and relationships which lie beyond the
boundaries of received legal scholarship.
56
This paper, then, explores some of my views on the project of legal
studies methodology. I have suggested several basic principles in devel-
oping a stance toward legal studies methods: the need for the researcher
to be present in her research, the need for a specific research question or
problem, the need to develop a strategic approach to research as a process
rather than as a set of isolated skills, and the need to develop reading/
analysis connected to the research question and the 'paradigm' or theory
within which research is being conducted.
When I gave one of my (former) students a copy of the first draft of this
paper, she suggested that I rename it, "Legal Research in a Social Science
Setting: the Problem of Problems," and suggested that the methods
project of which the course was part involves "nurturing the ... 'crises'
which Kuhn 57 claimed may be induced by repeated failure to make an
anomaly conform." ' For this student, as for me, the core of the endeavour
56. Galanter, "The Future", supra, note 9, at 1064.
57. Reference is to T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1962).
58. Correspondence, Angela MacDonald.
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is the process of generating research problems which capture the scope
of legal studies enquiry. Equally, theoretical informed understandings of
law in society help us to identify what it is that we want and need to know
about 'law'. Research methodology, then, is an essential element in the
legal studies curriculum.
Like research itself, the course contained its surprises and tangents,
some of which proved to be remarkably rich sources of insight and further
inquiry. Of course, students and instructor may have learned different
things! I find the project enormously interesting, and I hope this paper will
be both a contribution to our understanding of legal studies methodology
and an invitation to further conversation.
Appendix: Course Outline - Legal Research Methods
Guiding Questions.
Each section of the course was initiated by 'core questions' which were
designed to identify basic issues, to reassure students having those
questions, and to reinforce the idea that research, indeed scholarship, is
about having questions and pursuing their answers. In the process of
reviewing the course and writing this paper, I have modified one or two
of the original questions. The questions set out below are the current
'guiding questions'.5 9
I. The Research Setting: Planning
1. What does it mean to do research?
2. What is a 'research question' or research 'thesis'?
3. What is a research project in law? What is 'legal studies research'?
What kind of methodological implications arise from a 'social
science setting' for law research?
4. Do I have to deal with statistics?
5. How do I design a research project of my own?
6. What kinds of materials do I have available to me and how are they
organized? Are the materials and their organization 'neutral'? Are
there assumptions about law and classification and research which
have methodological implications?
59. I was also tempted to tinker with the questions by putting them into the third person: ideally
to give them (and me?) more apparent 'dignity'. Still, I choose to use the first person in my
outlines, in the hope that students will the questions as being their own and, in the spirit of
concreteness, I leave them that way.
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II. The Research Process: Implementation
7. When does 'research' start? What kinds of 'pre-library' work do I
need to do? How do I organize my research agenda?
8. How do I organize, keep track of and analyze my 'data'/ihformation?
9. How do I get directions to the research material I need? And how do
I find it? How do I know that what I've found is still current? Do I need
to check that it is?
10. What can on-line databases accessed through a computer contribute
to my research?
11. What's the difference between finding books and 'research'? How do
I sort through the mass of information to get at what is relevant?
12. How do I read law material? Do I have a 'standpoint' in research? Do
the authors of my sources have a standpoint? What effect might
'standpoint' have on objectivity in research? Is research 'value
neutral'? What about bias?
III. The Research Product: Action
13. When am I ready to write? Should I wait till I have all my ideas clear
before I start to write? How do I write the project up? What is the role
of outlines?
14. Is there a 'legal style'? Should I 'sound like a lawyer?'
15. What is the difference between arguing for a position and being an
'advocate'? Is advocacy consistent with the aims of scholarship and
research?
16. What about footnoting and citation: why does it matter? Why do
people get so picky about it?
17. Is revision really necessary? What does it mean to revise my work?
How many revisions do I have to do? Should I avoid the embarrass-
ment of showing it to anyone else until it's finished?
18. When am I finished? And, when I am finished, what should I do with
my research product? For that matter, do I need to do anything with
it at all, and why?
